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Our age is unique in that we currently possess the technological 
ability to alter drastically the lives of succeeding generations to an extent 
never before possible. Within minutes we could effectively destroy allUfe 
on our planet. While our actions, hopefully, will not be so drastic, there is 
precious little life on earth not being affected, for better or for worse, by the 
environmental and social practices of our time. Yet to bemoan this state of 
affairs is pointless; all history is an account of actions, changes, and effects, 
and if this be the path to humanity's destruction, it must also be the path to 
humanity's survival. What we can rightfully deplore, however, is the lack 
of anticipation and forethought in ourconceptions ofproper action. I am not 
speaking of the all too common blatant disregard for future conditions in 
favor of immediate self-interests, but of the lack of a consistent philosophi­
cal articulation of any moral obligation we have to humanity as a whole: 
past, present, and future, even among those highly concerned with social 
improvement, environmental protection, and the like. To be sure, all 
conscientious moral theories implicitly provide for a "better" future through 
theirprescriptions, but ifwe expect our collective actions, cultural practices, 
and philosophical thought to be moral, in the sense that they serve, in 
Washington's words, as "a meliorating influence on all mankind," not just 
for a few days, a few years, or even a few centuries, but absolutely, we must 
have a clear understanding of the rights and duties concerning the future 
inhabitants of our planet (qtd. in Tuchman 299). 
Philosophically speaking, the issue of rights is extremely complex 
and controversial. In light of the plethora of uses and misuses of the word 
"right," both past and present, we must first establish a clear, basic definition 
of the concepts involved. Basically, a right is most easily understood as a 
claim. However, as Joel Feinberg points out, this definition is somewhat 
circular, since a claim is usually defined as something like a right (qtd. in 
Beauchamp 197). But the idea of a claim is somewhat more useful in that 
it implies both an activity and a recipient. In other words, a claim is 
necessarily an action performed by an individual, or group of individuals, 
with respect to another individual, or group of individuals. Even claims 
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upon material objects entail certain relationships with others by restricting 
or mandating the actions of others with regard to the objects. This act of 
claiming is essentially a pronouncement of what is "correct" in the relation­
ship between the maker(s) and receiver(s) of the claim. Now, there are, of 
course, many senses ofthe word "correct," and this is one wayto distinguish 
among certain types of rights. For instance, the possessor of a legal right 
may properly claim to judge (or have judged for him) a certain action as 
legal; the possessor of a moral right has the ability to pronounce (or to have 
pronounced for him) the morality ofthe relevant activity or state of affairs. 
In short, a right is a statement of what is. right, or correct, or proper with 
regard to relationships and associations within a given community: legal, 
moral, etc.1 
Under our current defInition of a right, the source for authority for 
any such claim, or right, is necessarily found within the elements of the 
relationship involved in the activity ofclaiming. What this means is that the 
authority for a right originates in the individual or group upon which the 
claim is made. And, as before, rights may be further defined and classifIed 
according to the association which makes them possible. For example, a 
legal right of a citizen of the United States is based upon the internal rules 
I believe that this definition offers a good clue to the philosophical 
distrust and/or distaste for the concept of rights. A right is often seen as some 
sort of semi-mystical possession which governs human interaction, and failing 
to find a proper basis for such governance, philosophers reject the notion of 
rights, or at least claim that rights are secondary to some other necessary basis 
for decisions, such as a theory of ethics or justice in general (see Margaret 
Macdonald, qtd. in Beauchamp 208-210; and Ruth Macklin, qtd. in Beauchamp 
214-215). And it is the case that a strong argument can be made that in our 
present definition of a right assessments of their ultimate value cannot be made 
any more than "good" or "right" can be defined anywhere without the help of a 
more fundamental outlook. However, to realize these limitations is not to render 
the concept or consideration of rights pointless. What an analysis of rights doos 
allow is a more practical and immediate judgment of the consequences of more 
general ethical theories. An articulation of rights, within any conLcxt, forces 
consistent interpretation and formalizes conclusions, which arc two areas of 
concern which general theory all too often leaves open to dispute. Particularly 
for our purposes, an articulation of the nature of the rights of future individuals 
will not so much proscribe specific action as force consideration of future beings 
regardless of the ultimate standard of "good" employed in any given ethical 
analysis. 
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of political association present, and the assertion of such a right takes the 
fonn of a claim upon the United States government for the protection, 
rectification, or retribution made necessary by a confirmation ofthe right of 
the claimant. (Similarly. the government may make a claim upon the 
individual, a right to tax, for instance, to the extent which the formal 
associ ation between the individual and the government allows.) Other legal 
rights, likewise, fmd their origin and authority in the applicable political 
association. Rights involving any sort ofcontract necessarily arise from the 
association defined by the contract, and those parties involved are hence the 
makers and receivers of claims regarding that contract. Certain rights may 
be conferred, even without the consent ofthe recipient, ifagiven association 
provides for such actions (e.g., children, citizens in a totalitarian state, etc.), 
and again claims are made upon the issuing authority. Equal rights would 
be those conferred or agreed to on the basis of some type of equality: as 
humans, as citizens, as adults, etc. Thus far we have a fairly consistent 
notion that a right is the statement of a valid claim, in relation to a given 
association, and that it is from this association that the right derives its 
existence and meaning. This may not be as lofty and noble conception of 
rights as some people are used to, in that it portrays all rights as contingent 
and mutable, but it does not necessarily degrade the rights we possess as 
individuals who have entered into, or at least accepted, different associa­
tions. On the contmry, it makes the rights we do possess, as citizens of the 
United States, for example. all the more valuable in that they represent a 
highly evolved and civilized form of association, not merely the long­
awaited articulation ofsome supposed standard which humans have always 
been endowed with.2 
Here the important question arises: do humans possess any natural 
rights which exist prior to any social or political associations? If this were 
the case, a claim concurrent with such a right would have to be made in 
relation to nature in general.3 Considering the precariousness which 
dominates the association between m ankind and nature, the only valid claim 
Many will no doubt see a danger in defining rights as so contingent 
and mutable. I admit to this danger, but maintain that it is inescapable, and that 
only by acceptance of it may we fully guard against it (see Richard Rorty's 
essay «The Contingency of a Liberal Community" in Contingency, Irony, and 
Sglidarity). 
3 By "nature" I mean that physical set of conditions which exists for 
all humans, regardless of social or cultural associations. 
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which one could make, or right which one could possess, would be the right 
to survive to the best of one's abilities; nature guarantees nothing but a 
chance, and in some cases a slim chance at that. Yet this simple right to a 
chance for survival may be more significant than itseems at first glance. For 
if a human, through his or her action, deprives another human ofthat chance 
for survival which that individual would have had if notfor his or her actions, 
has not that which all humans-as creatures of nature-possess been 
altered, has not a right possibly been violated? Ifa human perishes through 
the actions of a hungry tiger, the violence of a lightening bolt, or the force 
ofan earthquake, nothing unnatural has occurred, and hence no natural right 
could have been violated or moral rule transgressed (assuming, of course, 
that no other human was responsible for the victim's presence in such 
dangerous circumstances). But in as much as human action changes the 
conditions ofan individual's relation to his or hernatural circumstances and 
lessens the chance for survival which would have otherwise been present, 
a right may be said to have been violated. Iffhis analysis is correct, it would 
mean that there is one right which may be regarded as absolute, which 
applies to all humans by virtue of their being creatures of nature (or, if you 
prefer, by necessarily existing within a certain range of physical conditions 
and conforming to certain physical restrictions and standards): each human 
has a right to survive to the best of his orher abilities. Of course, under the 
det1nition and theory that the maintenance of a right, yours or another's, is 
what is. right, if every human possesses this right absolutely, it is restrictive 
in the sense that no person may rightfully deprive another ofthis right, even 
in the assertion of his or her own right. 
How, then, does this view of rights concern future individuals? 
Clearly, in as much as most rights are contingent upon associations and/or 
agreements made, individuals who do not yet exist cannot be said to possess 
any such rights. True, some current political associations, for instancc, will 
grant certain rights concurrcnt with the existence of a new individual life, 
and it certainly seems proper and moral for us to guarantee that those rights 
which we currently value should be available to new individuals, but they 
certainly cannot possess them prior to existence.4 However, in as much as 
any absolute right exists rorall humans regardless of any associations, acase 
4 This is true not so much because claims could not be made, although 
that would be somewhat problematic, but because no association has been fanned. 
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can be made that the right of survival to the best ofone's abilities exists ~ 
forallindividuals who will come into being,5 In other words, the individuals 
ofthe future may be said to atemporallypossess arightofsurvival to the best 
their abilities, free from any hindrance by other individuals, prior to the fact 
of their existence,6 Hence. the right to survival to the best ofone's abilities 
is not merely absolute in the sense that every human has, does, and will 
automatically possess it, but that all humans who do and will exist possess 
that right at any given time,' 
!fthe rightto survival to the best ofone 's abilities exists, what duties 
or obligations does it entail, if any? First, we should consider the notion of 
correlative rights and duties in general. Tom Beauchamp summarizes this 
thesis as follows, "One person's right entails someone else's obligation to 
refrain from interfering or to provide some benefit, and all obligations 
similarly entail rights" (202). The standard criticism of this view is that not 
all rights entail duties and/or that not all duties entail rights. Beauchamp 
asks, "Such goods as adequate housing, clothing, food, health care, educa­
tion, and a clean environment populate the United Nations list of 'human 
rights,' yet does anyone have a corresponding duty" (205)? I would assert 
that under a definition of rights as valid claims upon associations that an 
individual deprived ofonc or more of these goods could make a valid claim 
Of course, when we enter the world our right 10 survival to the best 
ofour abilities on our own is not much of a right, but we shall discuss the extent 
to which other humans are obligated to help us assert our right when we exam­
ine correlative duties to this right. 
6 As to the metaphysics of possession without being, I would offer that 
perhaps as an absolute right applies to all humans, it also applies 10 humanity as 
a whole. And if humanity has a right to survive to the best of its abilities, this 
right is effectively represented by a conception of the rights of not yet existent 
humans. 
, As to the possession of this universal right by individuals who have 
died, they have presumably exercised their right to survive to the best of their 
abilities and failed at some point, thus sacrificing any possible future assertion 
of that right. This is not to say that their rights may not have been violated 
during their lives to such an extent that they did die, or that some sort of 
compensation to humanity should not be extracted fTOm the violators of their 
rights, but it is to say that any further protection of their right is futile. As Ernest 
Partridge points out, "The distinction [of rights between the unborn and the 
dead] follows from the fact that we (or perhaps others) can affect the conditions 
of life of the unborn, but we cannot alter the completed lives of the dead" (249). 
25 RIGHTS, DUTIES, AND THE FUTURE 
upon the United Nations and rightfully demand that the situation be rectified 
to the extent which the association makes such rectification possible. The 
organizations and agencies of the United Nations no doubt think that they 
are, to the best of their ability given the limited authority vested in their 
association with citizens of member nations, working to establish and 
protect these rights as is their duty. Certainly in a situation where the 
maintenance of these rights is rendered impossible, members ofthe United 
Nations consistently appeal to the association as a whole to fulfill a duty to 
come to their aid. The problem here is that some rights can only be stated 
as futile claims owing to the lack of authority present in the association 
responsible for the creation of these rights. This does not mean no duty 
exists, but that the right itself is insubstantial since a right, as a claim, 
divorced from effective duty, is essentially empty rhetoric. g Likewise, Joel 
Feinberg argues that there exist duties which do not correlate with rights. He 
says, "Duties of charity, for example. require us to contribute to one or 
another ofa large group ofeligible recipients, no one ofwhom can claim our 
contribution from us as his due" (qtd. in Beauchamp 204). But what is the 
origin of these "duties of charity?" Under Feinberg's analysis a "charity 
judge" could presumably be appointed to go to individuals, in the name of 
all in need of charity, and reprimand them for not giving to someQne. This 
idea is absurd: for there simply exists no such duty beyond promises made 
by individuals explicitly orirnplicitly, by membership in an association. For 
example, as a Catholic a given person, in the affirmation of his or her 
religious beliefs, may have acquired a duty to be charitable, and the Catholic 
Church would then certainly have a right to demand that person fulfill his or 
her duty and be charitable toward someone in need. In essence, the 
confusion here is caused by the broad sense ofthe word "duty." Duties exist, 
as rights do, as the result ofassociations and the ensuing repayment of debts 
or fulfillment of promises, but we often inappropriately (at least from a 
strictly philosophical perspective) see the duty as toward the object of the 
promise, for instance, as opposed to the individual or group to which the 
promise was made.9 
I would, however, agree that these rights are "claimable" only in so 
far as individuals are involved, through the aegis of their own government, with 
the U.N., not as humans in general. 
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How does the correlativity thesis then apply to the aforementioned 
absolute right of survival to the best of one's abilities? An absolute right 
would have to be correlated to an absolute duty, or a duty which is binding 
universally, upon all aspects of the association between humanity and 
nature. In a sense, nature fulfills its duty by being consistent, in that certain 
actions will, according to the so-called Laws of Nature, always produce 
certain results. But humans also JX)ssess a duty to 1) survive to the best of 
their abilities and 2) ensure that others are able to survive to the best oftheir 
abilities. In otherwords. human beings have an absolute obligation to adopt 
practices (environmental, cultural, social, philosophical, etc.) which allow 
all existing, and future existent. human beings to survive to the greatest 
extent which they are capable ofsurviving. This would necessarily entail the 
creation and maintenance of the most effective institutions, mechanisms, 
and associations JX)ssible to maximize the survival possibilities of all 
humanity. This rather encompassing duty goes beyond a simple principle 
of non-interference in an individual's "natural" ability to survive because 
the abilities of the individual in question are, under humanity's absolute 
duty, to be given every JX)ssib1e chance of manifestation in so far as another 
individual's possibilities are not mitigated. And to the extenl which 
nature-as it exists within each human-can act to fulfill this obligation, it 
is morally bound to do so. Summarily, human beings are absolutely 
obligated La maximize the survival possibilities contained within other 
humans, and all future humans, to the extent which the knowledge and 
ability of those thus obligated permits. Thus a human being, as an absolute 
possessor of the right to survive to the best of his or her abilities, is also, by 
the nature ofhis or her humanity and material existence, the embodiment of 
the absolute duty to protect and promote this same right in the rest ofnature 
as it exists in other present and future human beings. 
9 A further distincLion is oftcn made in this regard, as Mill and Kant 
have done, in discussions of perfect and imperfect duties. In Mill's case this 
seems to be just a distinction between what is basically an articulated, legal right 
(a perfeet duty) and more implicit types of rights resulting from some sort of 
moral association (imperfeet duties) (see Utilitarianism 48-49). In Kant's case, 
this distinction secms to reflect a difference between absolute and contingent 
standards which could be translated as absolute and contingent rights (see 
Foundations of the Metaphysics of Moral~ 5,39-42). In both cases, the argument 
for strict correlativity can still be made. 
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This admittedly somewhat polemical conclusion may be valid ifwe 
accept the given definition of a right, a claim, and a duty. But what are the 
consequences of such a view from an ethical perspective? In order to best 
answer this question, I shall attempt an analysis ofsome other philosophical 
positions and evaluate their stance on the problem of rights and obligations 
concerning the future, and thus demonstrate the implications and meanings 
of the view set forth above. 
Many philosophers have recently maintained that the idea of rights 
being possessed by the future is not a sound basis for ethical decisions. 
Richard T. DeGeorge offers three compelling reasons against the idea of 
"future rights." First, he states, "Future generations by definition do not 
exist now. They cannot now, therefore, be the present bearer or subject of 
anything, including rights" (95). On one level, of course, this makes perfect 
sense, in as much as rights are considered a "possession" equivalent to a 
material object. But there are numerous cases one can think of that lead to 
a different conclusion. Ifa baby is born, and there is no clean air for that child 
to breathe, and he or she dies after a few months, certainly, if there is 
anything like a right to a chance for survival free from the debilitating effects 
of another human's actions, it has been violated. Now, the violation, or 
action which caused an improper situation, could have happened at any time 
before the birth of the child, but may not have become physically evident 
until the child was born. We may say, then, that DeGeorge's viewpoint 
confuses violation of a right with evidence of that violation. Practically, 
there is little difference, but without a philosophical position which accepts 
violation as possible before it is evidenced, the prevention of violations 
would be rendered exceedingly difficult. Under our previous analysis, 
humanity, as a species, would also possess the right to survive to the best of 
its abilities, and if future children cannot survive that right has certainly been 
violated. Whether or not the "possession" ofthe right is actually had by the 
child before it exist.;; or by humanity as a whole actually, again, makes little 
difference. For the child of the future effectively serves as the instantiation 
ofany rights ofhumanity, and thinking in tenns ofthe child possessing rights 
is the most practical way to ensure nothing is violated. 
Secondly, DeGeorge states that "Such future generations could at 
least in theory be prevented from coming into existence. If they were never 
produced itwould be odd to say that their rights had been violated. Forsince 
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they do not now exist they can have no right to exist or be produced. Now, 
they have no present rights at all" (96). Again, if we consider a right of 
humanity to survive-and thus also a duty to allow, even promote its 
survival, in the sense of making such survival more likely-we see that 
preventing future generations from coming into existence m.&lviolates this 
right of humanity as a whole, and thus the right of every individual which 
would have existed. Now, ofcourse the objection and/or concern here is the 
question ofpossible humans verses actual future humans. BryonG. Norton 
recognizes this problem when he states, "There is a distinction between 
possibleorpotential individuals and future individuals .... Future people, ... 
are people who will, in fact exist at some subsequenttime. Itmightbe argued 
that even possible people have rights, for instance, a right to life... . Hence 
every avoidable failure ofconception would involve the violation ofa right 
to exist" (321). The solution to this problem ofdistinction between possible 
and actual future individuals maybeclarifiedby a restatement ofmyoriginal 
position. All human beings who will come into existence possess an 
absolute right to survive to the best oftheir abilities. Likewise, humans have 
an absolute duty to maximize survival possibilities of every human who 
comes into existence. Ofcourse, we seemingly have no way ofdistinguish­
ing between possible individuals and actual individuals until they are, in 
fact, actualized. But, let us consider how they are actualized. For it is 
through the actions of existing humans that a possible being is made an 
actual being. Thus, while we do not know ~ will exist 100 years from 
now, we do have control over, and a duty toward, those beings. And, ifwe 
are to maximize the survival potentials ofthose beings, as well as humanity 
as a whole, a large measure of this may be accomplished simply by 
manipulation oftheirnumber. Basically, what I am arguing here is that our 
correlative duty to the absolute right ofall individuals to survive to the best 
of their abilities entails responsible procreation, simply because this is an 
extremely important way in which we presently affect, through our actions, 
the lives ofthose future individuals who will exist. This is not the "easy way 
out" in that, as James L. Hudson says, " ... we can always avoid violating the 
rights of future people by preventing their coming into existence" (101). 
Nor does it represent, as Hudson later states. " ... a sort of !!!Q!1ll coereion 
which is equally illegitimate" since it violates a right to "blameless procre­
ation" (102). Rather, it represents a proper acknowledgment of the right of 
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all future humans and our duty towards them. To be sure, there was a time 
when it was a duty to procreate as much as possible in order to ensure the 
sUIvival of the race and maximize survival possibilities for the future, but, 
at present, achieving this same goal defmitely requires different actions. 
Derek Parfit raises a similar sort ofobjection in his construction of 
what has come to beknown as "Parfit' s Paradox." Essentially, he claims that 
a policy ofhigh consumption of environmental resources, which is clearly 
not acceptable to us, will produce different future individuals than a more 
restrained policy would, for a variety of reasons. But those individuals 
produced under a period of high consumption would not exist but for the 
depletion of resources, and it would be more against their interests not to 
exist than to be deprived ofany given resource (qtd. in Norton 322-3). What 
Parfit's supposed paradox actually does is provide us with a good reason not 
to blame the past for our difficulties, but this does not abrogate any 
responsibility we have to the future. Again, it is up to presently existing 
individuals to maximize the survival possibilities of future humans, whom­
ever they may actually be. It is also up to present individuals to create future 
humans in a way which does not undermine, in fact which enhances, Lhose 
same survival possibilities. Thus, high consumption would entail a respon­
sibility to low procreation, which may be necessary owing to already 
committed acts of high consumption. But, such a continued policy obvi­
ously jeopardizes Lhe survival of humanity as a whole thus violating 
everyone's rights. 
Another aspect of Parfit's argument will be dealt with in consider­
ing the final point of DeGeorge. His third objection is that "Speaking of the 
rights of future generations as if Lheir rights were present rights ... leads to 
impossible demands on us" (97). Essentially, he states that iffuture person..<; 
possess rights, and there are an infinite number of future persons, anything 
which alters our environment (the use of a non-renewable resource, [or 
example) is a violation of some future individual's right. As Norton also 
points out, "All Lhis is somewhat bewildering and has, not surprisingly, the 
effect of paralyzing rather than guiding decision making" (333). While at 
first glance this paradox may also seem true, it actually confuses the 
essential factor of human survival with the non-essential aspects of our 
culture and society. For instance, humans lived for thousands of years 
without using uranium as a power source. We know Lhat it would be 
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perfectly possible for the full exercise ofhuman potential wi thout its use. If 
we, therefore, deplete the supply of uranium, we are not necessarily 
violating any right held by future individuals, cxCcpt in so far as we bring 
them into a world which. Wcause of over,population. destruction of other 
environmental resources. Of just plain stUpidity. we make the usc of such a 
non-renewable resource nec~ssaty for their survival. In other words, if we 
construct a society which depends on crude oil for its functioning, and make 
no provisions for the inevitable depletion of that resource, and thus leave 
individuals 200 years from now faced with the well-nigh impossible task of 
a total, sudden restructuring ofsociety once the oil runs out, wehave violated 
their rights by failing to maximize their survival potential to the extentwhich 
we could have done so without adversely affecting our own survival. 
Certainly, this is an awesome duty to live up to, made no less difficult by the 
actions ofour predecessors, but it certainly does not paralyze us to the point 
of inaction. 
There are, however, some philosophers who have suggested ways 
in which "rights of the future" may be made more plausible. Bryon Norton 
suggests that it is the individualistic nature of basic rights theory which 
causes most of the problems which arise in any discussion of rights of future 
beings. He says, for instance, "Indeed Rousseau's ethical categories. where 
the General Will (the interests of an organic community not reducible to 
individual interests) is sharply distinguished from the will-of-all (the aggre­
gated interests ofindividuals), may be revived as an important possibility in 
modem ethics" (337). This approach, also, would have some problematic 
aspects. Namely, that the classical liberal tradition responsible for so much 
of basic concept of rights in general lacks a vocabulary of discussion 
removed from the cases of individual interactions and individualistic 
assertions of rights. But Norton definitely has a point. For instance, in my 
arguments above, I often mentioned a right of humanity to survive as a 
species to the best of its abilities that somehow went along with an 
individual's right to survive to the bcstofhis or her abilities-in as much as 
the species and the individual are both objects of the ubiquitous set of 
conditions and circumstances we call nature. Perhaps what is needed is an 
articulationofa "species right" somewhat along the linesofMarx's "species 
being." But I believe my position stands well enough without such an 
articulation in as much as my considerations of future rights are based only 
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upon what I have taken to be an absolute right-<>ne which categorically 
applies to all instances ofhumanity, and which thus may be said to apply to 
humanity as a whole. 
Rolf Satorius also maintains the existence of the rights of future 
individuals. He states quite simply that"~generations ofcourse do not 
existllQ.S£,; they have no interests now, vital or otherwise, and they can make 
no claims upon us. But the nature of the vital interests they will have is a 
valid basis for claims upon us as to how we oUght to behave" (197). And he 
even goes so far as to say, " If ~have a right that government protect Ql!! 
right through an effective exercise of the guardianship with which it is 
entrusted, ~ have a similar right. My suggestion is that judicial recogni­
tion of that right may be required to full secure it" (201). I believe his 
statements to be plausible in that he implies that a denial of future rights 
would probably entail a denial of rights absolutely, since there would be no 
denying the fact that it makes no sense to claim for ourselves what we will 
not grant to others who will be in the same situation. His suggestion oflega! 
representation does, however, bring up an interesting problem. Any 
consideration of rights of the future entails some sort of knowledge about 
future conditions and the future consequences of present actions. Our 
knowledge in this area is obviously limited and conditional, so how can we 
insure an effective basis lor decisions? Just as our duty to the future entails 
responsible procreation, I maintain that it also entails responsible investiga­
tion. By that I mean we must, to the full extent ofour abilities, seek to know 
the possible and probable consequences of our actions. Ignorance of the 
scope to which a right is being infringed upon does not mean it has not been 
violated. Although responsibility may certainly be mitigated in this way. it 
may only be lessened to the point to which possible investigation was done 
concerning the effects of present actions. Basically, we have a duty to know 
as much as we can so as to maximize both present and future survival 
possibilities. But, the ultimate 1ack of certainty in dealing with the future can 
not be conscientiously turned into a denial ofcither rights or responsibilities; 
it can only be turned into reasonable caution. 
Before concluding, I would add a word about the quality of that 
survival which results from the exercise of a human's right to survive to the 
best of his or her abilities. There are, of course, many forms of "survival" 
which no one would wish upon the future. But a guarantee of a chance for 
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survival is not enough to fulfill our duty toward the future, for it must be a 
survival free from any sort of deprivation (environmentally, culturally, 
socially) caused by current action or practice. For to the extent which we 
deprive future individuals of choice, possibilities, and freedom of action, we 
shall deprive them of that which is the unconditional due to all humans-a 
fighting chance. Ofcourse, some impositions are inescapable because ofthe 
simple fact that our existence always takes place within a given context, but 
contextual restraints are not the same as negligent deprivations. For humans 
are also bound to their own struggle for survival, but within our own 
struggling, we are not simply struggling for ourselves, but for the future as 
well. 
We have seen how the adoption of a certain conception of rights as 
claims leads to both an accountofthe contingency of most of what we speak 
of as "rights," and to the fundamental nature ofa right to survive to the best 
of our abilities--as individuals and as a species. We have seen how this 
absolute right entails an absolute obligation, not only to other recognizable 
beings, but to all beings who do or will exist, since they will unconditionally 
possess the same right. And we have seen how this position answers some 
of the problems inherent in a philosophical clarification in an area of 
increasing concern in our lifetimes. Indeed, there are no doubt other 
conceptions of responsibility to the future which could serve in this capacity 
(theological duties, for instance), but these arguments tend to be weak in the 
sense that we have trouble even applying their consequences to the present, 
let alone the future. My point is this: in our lives we presently invoke the 
notion ofrights a great deal, reflecting the fact that our mind-set is somewhat 
comfortable with their use. This is not to say rights theories are free from 
problems and contradictions by any means; it is merely to say that a rights­
based account ofresponsibility toward the future may be whatis needed to 
actualize and vivify our increasingly necessary concern with the ethical 
repercussions of our actions, not just within a currently existing moral 
community, but within the spectrum of human existence as a whole. 
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